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Robinson LADB News Analyst The failed coup d'etat launched on May 25 by deposed Guatemalan
president Jorge Serrano was the first major test of the Clinton administration's Latin America policy
in the face of a hemispheric political crisis. Swift US opposition, in conjunction with several other
factors, was crucial in aborting the attempted takeover by Serrano and the Guatemalan army.
Apart from the stubborn impasse in Haiti, which the democratic administration inherited from
its republican predecessor, the Clinton White House had faced a "trouble free" Latin America
prior to the events in Guatemala. This allowed the new Clinton team to focus attention on pressing
foreign policy hot spots outside Washington's traditional "sphere of influence," such as Bosnia,
Somalia, Russia, and the Middle East. The Clinton administration's actions in the face of the
May 25-June 5 crisis in Guatemala are congruent with earlier pronouncements that defense of
democracy and human rights would be a centerpiece of Clinton policy toward Latin America. This
defense would serve as the political counterpart to the promotion of free trade and hemispheric
economic integration. The new policy was outlined in a widely-circulated report released by the
Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue late last year, titled "Convergence and Community:
The Americas in 1993." The document was viewed as a blueprint of Clinton's Latin America
policy. The contours of that policy were subsequently ratified by deputy secretary of state Clifton
Wharton in a May 3 address to the Council of the Americas, an address which was seen as the
first official statement of Clinton policy (See Notisur 05/14/93). Washington's actions in the face
of the Guatemala crisis were also consistent with the "Santiago Commitment to Democracy,"
formally incorporated into the Organization of American States (OAS) charter in December 1992.
This "Commitment" stipulates that any member states which break with democracy should be
suspended from the organization. It also calls for adoption of collective, hemispheric action to
pressure for the restoration of constitutional rule. However, US action in Guatemala in the wake of
the coup was considerably more complex than what is already being referred to in some quarters
as a "model for preserving and promoting democracy" in Latin America. The stance Washington
adopted deserves cautious analysis for what it portends regarding US policy and inter-American
relations under the first post-Cold War US president. Clinton's Handling of the Guatemala Crisis
On the morning of May 25, Serrano dissolved the Congress and the Supreme Court, suspended
parts of the constitution, and announced that he planned to rule by decree. The coup provoked
a strong and swift international outcry. At the same time, mass protest against Serrano's power
grab inside Guatemala threatened to mushroom into a veritable uprising of civil society. Faced
with this explosion of opposition, Serrano and his supporters in the military were forced to back
down, paving the way for the restoration of constitutional order with the June 5 swearing in of
Ramiro de Leon Carpio as the new "consensus" President (See Notisur 06/11/93). Within hours of
the pre-dawn coup, the White House issued a harshly-worded statement condemning Serrano's
actions as "illegitimate" and calling for the restoration of "full constitutional democracy." US
officials maintained this forceful opposition to the rapidly disintegrating putsch as the OAS voted
to send a delegation to Guatemala, headed by Secretary General Joao Baena Soares, and convened
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an emergency Ad Hoc Commission to monitor the situation. Two days after the coup, the State
Department announced that, with the exception of humanitarian assistance, it was suspending
all US aid programs with Guatemala, totaling about US$48 million, as well as US participation in
credits to Guatemala through international lending agencies. In the following days, in concert with
the international community, Washington upped the ante. Simultaneous to announcements of
aid suspensions by the European Community and Japan, US officials threatened to suspend trade
preferences enjoyed by Guatemala under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) pending a resolution of the crisis. Meanwhile, formal and informal
discussions began in the OAS and other hemispheric diplomatic circles to explore the possibility
of imposing tougher economic sanctions, including a trade embargo. Following De Leon Carpio's
appointment, Washington quickly dispatched Wharton and assistant secretary for inter-American
affairs Bernard Aronson to Guatemala City as a show of support for the new government. The two
confirmed that the US aid program would be resumed and the other economic sanctions suspended.
This steadfast and overwhelming US opposition to the putsch something which the coup plotters
had clearly underestimated was an important factor in galvanizing hemispheric and international
mobilization in favor of a restoration of constitutionality. US and OAS actions followed, almost
to the letter, the recommendations contained in the Inter-American Dialogue report under the
heading "The collective defense of democracy." That report called for the following consecutive
steps in times of "democratic breakdown": * A "forceful hemispheric condemnation of the illegal
usurpation of power." * "Work collectively to repair the democratic process." * "The inter-American
community should not try to impose a predetermined solution following a democratic breakdown."
* Stronger sanctions should be applied "when an illegally constituted government refuses to engage
in negotiations to restore democratic order." * "The priority aim of collective hemispheric action
must be to restore the democratic process as quickly as possible." Defense of Democracy or Defense
of Stability? Clearly, Serrano launched his abortive putsch on the basis of the grave miscalculation
that he would be treated in a manner similar to Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. With strong
backing from the Peruvian armed forces, in April 1992 Fujimori dissolved congress, suspended the
constitution, and imposed executive control over the judiciary. The international community, led
by Washington, was considerably more lenient in Peru than in Guatemala. Although Washington
suspended bilateral assistance to Peru, and OAS officials gave Fujimori a slap on the wrist, the
Peruvian strongman was ultimately successful in pulling off the coup. A new constituent assembly
elected to replace the dissolved legislature was endorsed by the OAS and by Washington. Praising
the Peruvian "political reforms," the Clinton administration contributed over half of a new US$900
million multilateral bridge loan in February, and then in early May helped Peru to reschedule its
US$21 billion foreign debt. In explaining US policy toward Peru, Tim Wirth, Clinton's assistant
secretary of state for Global Affairs a new post created with the stated aim of promoting democracy
abroad recently noted: "It's important to work with them and try to move them back into the
column of working democracies" by not "cutting off all aid." The Peruvian military continues to
play a predominant role in the government, human rights violations in Peru have not ceased,
and recent constitutional amendments proposed by Fujimori to reduce the scope of legislative
powers and to institutionalize the executive's right to again dissolve that body, all indicate that
democracy has hardly been restored in Peru. Nevertheless, by the time Serrano decided to launch
his gambit, the State Department had for the most part normalized relations with Lima, effectively
legitimizing the Fujimori regime. What accounts for this apparent double standard regarding Peru
and Guatemala? Hemispheric economic integration and the free market fury sweeping the continent
have made Latin America increasingly important as a market and as an outlet for investments for
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the recovery and restructuring of the US economy. Heightened economic interdependence has
increased the importance for Washington of political stability and social peace in Latin America.
US policy makers reached consensus several years ago that negotiated settlements to conflicts and
the installation of representative democratic regimes are, as a rule, the best means to achieve this
stability. Yet there are exceptions, as the Peruvian example so vividly demonstrates. The conditions
necessary for stability were quite different in Peru than in Guatemala. The Peruvian putsch,
which met with widespread public support, had the effect of reversing the rapid deterioration
of the domestic political situation and of turning the tide in the counterinsurgency effort against
Sendero Luminoso at a time when the guerrillas were in strategic ascent. Although democratic
institutions and constitutionality were jettisoned in Peru, Fujimori's coup actually wound up
improving the prospects for stability. In sharp contrast, Serrano's move was repudiated by nearly
all sectors of Guatemalan society. The internal situation deteriorated so rapidly in the wake of
Serrano's coup that the country soon found itself on the brink of a political abyss. Washington, as
the hegemonic power in the hemisphere, faced a situation in which the rupture with constitutional
order was a considerably larger threat in Guatemala than in Peru. Given that the motivation
behind "promoting and defending democracy" is a cold calculation of the most expedient means of
assuring stability in the Western hemisphere, Washington's commitment to authentic democracy
clearly goes only as far as stability requires. Therefore, defending stability whether it be through
constitutional order or through authoritarian mechanisms is not equivalent to defending democracy,
and should not be described as "promoting democracy." This raises important questions as to
what stance the Clinton administration will assume during the current phase in Guatemala, now
being referred to as "institutional reestablishment." Protecting Constitutional Order is not Enough
What was resolved in Guatemala in early June was a conjunctural crisis of constitutionality, not
the country's deep-rooted social, economic, and political problems. Without doubt, the manner in
which this crisis was resolved has shaken the country's political structures, opened up new space
for civic and popular participation, and presented Guatemalan society with a once-in-a-generation
opportunity to address the deeper problems that have beleaguered the country for the past forty
years. Enormous expectations have been awakened inside Guatemala. There is a veritable clamor
for an end to military impunity and human rights violations, full subordination of the military to
civilian authority, an end to drug trafficking and corruption, and for reaching a peace accord with
the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca,
URNG) to put an end to a 30-year civil war which has resulted in a quarter of a million casualties.
Beyond this, there must be modifications in the country's notoriously backward economic and
social structures, responsible for making Guatemala one of the most unjust, unequal, and violent
societies in the world. About 87% of the population lives in poverty, and more than half in a state of
indigence. Four out of every five Guatemalan children are malnourished, over 60% of the population
is un- or underemployed, and 67% is illiterate. Barely 30% of the population has access to adequate
health care and running water, while the mortality rate of 73.3 per thousand live births is one of the
highest in the world. At the roots of this impoverishment is an extremely unequal distribution of
wealth and one of the most backward patterns of land tenure in the hemisphere. The richest 20%
of the population receives 55% of national income, compared to the poorest 20% with only 4.5%.
Although 60% of the population labors in the agricultural sector, fewer than 2% of landowners own
65% of all arable land. At the other extreme, 78% of the rural population composed overwhelmingly
of the country's oppressed majority of Maya and other indigenous groups subsists on just 10% of
the land. In a country where government revenue amounts to only 9% of GDP one of the lowest
rates in the world the rightist business community has for decades vetoed any attempt, not only to
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redistribute wealth, but to minimally improve the government's revenue base through income and
property taxes, which might allow the government to improve social conditions. The neo-liberal
structural adjustment program implemented by Serrano, under the supervision of the international
lending agencies and the US Agency for International Development (AID), has only exacerbated
these inequalities. Indeed, Serrano launched his abortive coup partially in response to an escalation
of student and labor protests over a new package of austerity measures, including bus fare and
utility rate hikes. De Leon Carpio, in his first weeks in office, proclaimed that it was time to "forgive
and forget," backed an amnesty for those who participated in the putsch, and affirmed that there
would be no changes in the structural adjustment program. Subsequent government appointments
and measures have further confirmed the heavy hand of military influence in the new government.
Apparently, the new President, by himself, does not have the maneuvering room, or the will, to
undertake the broad political, social and economic changes that Guatemala desperately needs.
Merely protecting De Leon's presidency is therefore not enough. Will Washington contemplate
using the same threat of economic and diplomatic isolation which was so effective in bringing about
a collapse of the coup as leverage to force the military, the hard-line business community, and the
political elite to address the root causes of the country's problems? The threat of an economic cordon
sanitaire around Guatemala was probably the decisive factor that tilted the internal balance of
forces away from the coup plotters. Given the heavy reliance of Latin American governments on
trade, loans and other financial assistance, and ever- increasing economic interdependence, the
threat of economic and trade sanctions by the international community can have a tremendous
influence on local political events and protagonists. This became manifest in Guatemala, where the
export-oriented segment of the economy, represented by the powerful Coordinating Committee
of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF), played a crucial role
in ousting Serrano. CACIF affiliates account for 70% of the country's total private sector activity.
The United States is the biggest market for Guatemala's exports and the country is fast becoming
a major maquiladora platform for transnational companies. Loss of trade privileges with the US,
not to mention a full-scale economic embargo, would have been disastrous for the Guatemalan
entrepreneurial class. As a result, the business community, which has maintained a strategic alliance
with the military for decades, realized that defending constitutional rule was necessary to protect
its own economic interests. To the astonishment of many, CACIF leader Mauricio Wurmser was
adamant in calling for Serrano to "reestablish the rule of law" in order to stave off the possibility
of "economic chaos," and the business group went on to participate actively in the negotiations
which culminated in De Leon Carpio's appointment. Business as Usual or Social Change? The key
question is how will the United States and the international community chose to apply this leverage.
Opting to use its influence in Guatemala in order to merely stabilize the new presidency would
be tantamount to propping up the social and economic status quo. Will Washington now defend
stability in Guatemala, or will it really defend democracy, which means pushing for authentic social,
political and economic change? The broad respect won by De Leon Carpio in firmly defending
human rights while he served as ombudsman gives the new government the legitimacy it needs
to regain credibility and international financing. Meanwhile, the crowd of international reporters
who descended upon Guatemala to cover the coup has long since gone home. In Washington, the
OAS formally dissolved the emergency Ad Hoc Commission and declared the Guatemalan crisis
"resolved." For its part, the Clinton State Department expressed "satisfaction" over this "success" in
Latin America. Despite the pervasive militarization at every level of Guatemalan society, there has
recently been talk in diplomatic circles that US policymakers have resigned themselves to seeking
a "Chilean solution" for Guatemala, whereby the armed forces would remain autonomous and
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intact side by side with a civilian administration. On June 3, the OAS's Inter-American Human
Rights Commission released a report on the situation in Guatemala. It asserts that "militarization
of the country" is the source of systematic human rights violations, and adds that "structural
problems" and social inequalities are "the cause and origin" of these violations. The report singles
out the Guatemalan state as "the principal executor and organizer of violations against the press,
trade unions, universities, and indigenous organizations." Despite this report, OAS diplomats
felt comfortable in declaring the Guatemalan crisis "resolved" with the return to a constitutional
presidency. The US bears an historic responsibility for the situation in Guatemala, given its role
in orchestrating the covert overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz
in 1954. That intervention destroyed the only authentic democratic experiment in the country's
history and threw Guatemala into a 40-year embroglio, with incalculable social costs. If the Clinton
administration's declared policy of supporting democracy is to be anything more than business as
usual in its "traditional sphere of influence," then having restored constitutional rule was only the
prelude to its real test in the hemisphere: what it does next in Guatemala.

-- End --
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